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Constitutional Law-EQUAL PROTECTION-PARENT
AND
CHILD-ADOPTION-UNWED
FATHER
HASEQUAL
PROTECTION
RIGHT
TO CONSENT-caban u. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Abdiel Caban and Maria Gonzalez lived together out of wedlock for nearly four and a half years. During this period Maria
bore two children. Caban's name appeared on the children's birth
certificates, and Caban contributed to their support.l
Three years after the birth of the first child, Maria left Caban
for a relationship with another man, Kazim Mohammed, taking
the children with her. Within a month she and Mohammed were
married. Though Caban did not contribute to the children's support while they lived with their mother and her new husband, he
visited them regularly.'
When the Mohammeds filed a petition for adoption of the
~ h i l d r e n Caban
,~
cross-petitioned. After a hearing in the surrogate's court, the Mohammeds' petition was granted.4 As a result,
any parental rights or obligations Caban might have had were
terminated. The surrogate relied on Section 111of the New York
Domestic Relations Law,J which limits consent rights in the adoption of illegitimate children to the natural mother. Caban's opportunities in the hearing were therefore limited to attempting to
subvert Maria's consent privilege by impugning her parental fitnessQr attempting to show t h a t the Mohammeds' adoption
1. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979).
2. Id. a t 382.
3. Id. a t 383 & n.1. According to New York statute, the parent and his or her spouse
may adopt the offspring of either, born in or out of wedlock. N.Y. DOM.REL.LAW§ 110
(McKinney 1977). A New York court has held that this statute provides for adoption of
illegitimate children by their mother. In re Anonymous Adoption, 177 Misc. 683, 31
N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sur. Ct. 1941).
4. 441 U.S. a t 383-84.
5. "Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be required as follows: . . . Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of
wedlock . . . ." N.Y. DOM.REL.LAW§ 111(1) (McKinney 1977).
6. Maria's consent would not have been required for any disposition of the children
if Caban could have proven the existence of any of the following criteria by which parental
consent may be dispensed with: (1) failure to visit or communicate with the children for
more than six months, (2) surrender of the children to an adoption or welfare agency, (3)
appointment of a guardian for the children because of parental unfitness, (4) loss of civil
rights, or (5) mental illness or retardation making Maria a t present and in the future
incapable of caring properly for the children. N.Y. DOM.REL.LAW§ 111(2) (McKinney
1977).
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would not serve the best interests of the children.' Even had he
succeeded, any possibility of his own adoption of the children, as
noted by the surrogate,%ould be foreclosed as long as Maria
withheld her consent.
Failing in the state court^,^ Caban appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. He argued that section 111 violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in allowing
all parents but unwed fathers the right to consent to the adoption
of their children.'We also claimed that his due process right to
maintain his relationship with his children had been revoked
without a finding that he was an unfit parent! Considering only
the equal protection argument as it related to the distinction
drawn between unwed mothers and unwed fathers,I2 the Court
found that the classification was not substantially related to the
state's objective of promoting adoption. Accordingly, it found
section 111 unconstitutional as applied.13

Stanley v. IllinoisI4marks the beginning of the contemporary
development of unwed fathers' rights. Before Stanley, the unwed
father was generally without rights, and all parental rights resided in the unwed mother.'" few jurisdictions, however, recog7. 441 U.S. a t 386-87. Doe v. Roe, 37 A.D.2d 433,326 N.Y .S.2d 421 (1971), articulates
the New York best-interests-of-the-child standard. See also N.Y. DOM.REL.LAW$ 111a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).But see Corey L. v. Martin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383,391,380
N.E.2d 266, 270, 408 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (1978) (parental interest standard supercedes the
best-interests-of-the-child standard).
8. 441 U.S. a t 384; Appendix to Appellant's Brief a t 27, Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. a t 380 (1979).
9. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in In re David A.C., 56 A.D.2d
627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1977), affirmed the surrogate's opinion on grounds that the constitutional challenge to 4 111 was foreclosed by the New York Court of Appeals decision in
In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), appeal
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question sub nom. Orsini v. Blasi, 423 U S .
1042 (1977).
The court of appeals did likewise in a memorandum decision. In re David A.C., 43
N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977).
10. 441 U.S. a t 385.
11. Id.
12. Id. a t 394 n.16.
13. Id. a t 394.
14. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
15. See, e . g , Adoption of a Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 156 N.E.2d 801 (1959) (during
illegitimacy, natural mother acts in her own behalf and as the father's agent in all matters
affecting the child); Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 12 Utah 2d 235,364 P.2d 1029 (1961)
(father of illegitimate not recognized as having any paternal status under common law).
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nized custodial rights in the unwed father if paternal custody
served the child's best interest;I6 a few recognized a right to consent to adoption if the child were legitimated.I7Stanley indicated
that an unwed father could have a constitutionally protectable
right in his relationship with his illegitimate child, one that could
not be terminated without a hearing on his parental fitness. A
subsequent case, Quilloin v. Walcott,Is clarified that the relationship to be protected was not merely biological, but arose from
significant support and custody of the child.
16. See, e.g., In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N. W.2d 27 (1967); In re Brennan,
270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965). In these cases the mother had surrendered her
rights to the child. The father was found to have rights to custody as against all but the
mother. The father in In re Mark T. had lived with the mother and child, had paid all
birth expenses, and had supported the family until the mother left him, taking the child
with her. He had even proffered marriage, but was refused. The mother released the child
for adoption without telling the father, and the adoption agency, even though it knew that
the parents had been living together with the child, did not notify him. The father filed a
writ of habeas corpus after a persistent search, as the child had been placed with adoptive
parents and their petition for adoption had been filed. In giving custody of the child to
the father the court wrote:
A common theme which runs through the cases, those concerning both
legitimate and illegitimate children, is that an established family relationship
is ordinarily to be preferred and protected.

....

We are not aware of any sociological data justifying the assumption that
an illegitimate child reared by his natural father is less likely to receive a proper
upbringing than one reared by his natural father who was a t one time married
to his mother, or that the stigma of illegitimacy is so pervasive it requires
adoption by strangers and permanent termination of a subsisting relationship
with the child's father.
8 Mich. App. a t 141, 146, 154 N.W.2d a t 36, 39. Cf. Roe v. Doe, 58 Mich. 2d 757, 296
N.Y.S.2d 865 (Fam. Ct. 1968) (father has parental rights secondary t o those of mother
with respect to child born out of wedlock); Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592
(1965) (mother, if a suitable person, has paramount right to custody of the child).
17. In all jurisdictions an unwed father acquires consent rights by marriage to the
mother and acknowledgement of paternity. The only issue has been timing-whether a
post-birth marriage and legitimation invalidates a mother's consent to adoption and the
child's placement with adoptive parents. See, e.g., Ellis v. Woods, 214 Ga. 105,103 S.E.2d
297 (1958) (father's consent required if marriage occurs before mother's consent to adoption); Warner v. Ward, 401 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1966) (father's consent required if marriage
occurs before final judgment of adoption).
The few jurisdictions that gave the father a consent right without marriage to the
mother, did so on the condition that the unwed father legitimated the child by voluntary
acknowledgement or formal establishment of paternity. See, e . g , ALA.CODEtit. 27, fj 3
(1958) (renumbered as § 26-10-3in 1975) (establishment of paternity); ARK.STAT.ANN.§
56-106 (1971) (repealed 1977) (current version a t ARK.STAT.
ANN.4 56-206 (Supp. 1979))
(establishment of paternity); NEV.REV.STAT.§ 127.040 (1967) (establishment of paternal
rights in proper court).
18. 434 U S . 426 (1978).
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Stanley v. Illinois

Stanley had sired three children during an eighteen-year illicit relationship with Joan Stanley. By not including unwed fathers in the definition of "parent,"1Bthe Illinois illegitimacy statute conclusively presumed unwed fathers to be unfit. So after
Joan Stanley's death, a dependency hearing was held, and the
children were declared wards of the state. Stanley claimed that
the statute violated his equal protection rights, since all parents
but unwed fathers were provided a hearing on their fitness before
being deprived of their children. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley's claim, holding the presumption of the statute
valid.20
Stanley presented the same argument to the United States
Supreme Court. The Court recognized the important interest
some unwed fathers have in their off~pring,~'
but rather than
focusing on its protection under the equal protection clause, the
Court recalled earlier cases that had overturned conclusive statutory presumptions like I l l i n o i ~ ' Reasoning
.~~
that the administrative convenience of "procedure by presumption" was outweighed
by Stanley's substantive right to his children, the Court held that
the due process clause required a fitness hearing before this right
could be terminated.23The Court also added that since all other
parents received such a hearing, depriving Stanley of a hearing
contravened the equal protection clause.
This tandem due process/equal protection holding created
some confusion in the interpretation of the case: whether Stanley
applied narrowly to similar fact situations, affording due process
rights only to Stanley-like unwed fathers, or whether the equal
-

-

19. ILL.REV.STAT.ch. 37, 4 701-14 (1967).
20. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U S . 645 (1972).
21. "It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements.' " 405 U.S. a t 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
22. 405 U.S. at 653-56. The Court referred to Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971),
which disapproved a post-automobile accident scheme that required, without reference
to fault, a bond and license revocation, and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), which
disapproved a Texas statute that presumed all military personnel to be nonresidents.
23. Irrebutable presumption analysis has been severely criticized by members of the
Court and others as "an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself." Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Ackerman, The Conclusive
Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REV.761 (1977).
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protection language implied the broader requirement of extending to all unwed fathers the same substantive rights given other
parents.24

B. Development of Unwed Fathers' Rights Since Stanley
A footnote to Stanley that suggested notice be given to all
unwed fathers, whether interested or not, supported a broad reading of the Court's opinion.25A broad reading was also supported
by the Court's subsequent remand of two cases "for further consideration in light of Stanley v . Illinois. "26 In one case,
Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan,27 the Illinois courts had given custody
of two illegitimate children to the mother over the father's objections, because " 'a putative father should have no right to the
society' of his children born out of wedlock."28In the other, State
ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social S e r v i ~ ethe
, ~ ~Wisconsin courts
had rejected an unwed father's challenge to a completed adoption
of which he had not received notice?
Influenced to take this broad view of Stanley, state courts
invalidated legislation that denied the unwed father the consent
.~~
a result, state legisprivilege in the adoption of his ~ f f s p r i n gAs
latures were compelled to reformulate their adoption statutes to
recognize the interests of the unwed father. The most extreme
24. See Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights:
Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM.L.Q.527, 527-32 (1975); Comment, Protecting
the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J .
FAM.L. 115, 125-26 (1973).
25. 405 U S . a t 657 n.9.
26. Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972); Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Serv., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
27. 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970), vacated, 405 U S . 1051 (1972).
28. Id. a t 415,262 N.E.2d a t 720 (quoting DePhillips v. DePhillips, 35 Ill. 2d 154, 157,
219 N.E.2d 465, 467 (1966)).
29. 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran
Social Serv., 405 U S . 1051 (1972).
30. The Wisconsin Court quoted the following language of the Utah Supreme Court:
"The claim of the plaintiffs is based upon the theory of a chattel ownership
of the child, but no such right is capable of legal recognition. The putative father
of an illegitimate child occupies no recognized paternal status a t common law
or under our statutes. The law does not recognize him a t all, except that it will
make him pay for the child's maintenance if it can find out who he is. The only
father it recognizes as having any rights is the father of a legitimate child."
47 Wis. 2d a t 434, 178 N.W.2d a t 63 (quoting Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 12 Utah
235, 239, 364 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (1961)).
31. E.g., People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d
291 (1972). Cf. Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976) (statute violative of
state equal rights amendment).
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legislative response unreservedly gave the unwed father rights
equal to those of traditional parents-married parents and unwed
mothers." Most states took-or retained-a more moderate approach, placing some burden on the unwed father: from simple
identification with the child by some sort of a~knowledgement,~"
to proof of past and potential familial relati~nship?~
New York,
on the other hand, held to the narrow view of Stanley, requiring
that notice of the adoption proceedings be given to certain unwed
fathers," but never extending their paternal privilege as far as the
consent right?
Finally, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the
.~~
scope of the unwed father's rights in Quilloin u. W a l ~ o t tThis
32. ARIZ.REV.STAT.§ 8-106 (West Supp. 1979-1980);DEL.CODEANN.tit. 13, $ 908
(Supp. 1978); ILL.REV.STAT.ch. 40, § 1510 (1977) (ILL.ANN.STAT.ch. 4, 9.1-8 (SmithHurd Supp. 1979));IOWA
CODEANN.§ 600.3 (West Supp. 1979-1980);WYO.STAT.$ 1-22109 (1977).
33. The minimum identification with the child required by the states was "presumed
parenthood," a rebuttable presumption that arises from cohabitation, marriage corresponding with the child's birth, attempted marriage before birth, attempted marriage after
birth with the father's name on the birth certificate or a voluntary promise of support, or
reception of the child into the father's home and openly holding him to be the father's
natural child. CAL.CIV.CODE$ 9 224, 7004 (West Supp. 1979); COLO.REV.STAT.4 19-6105 (1978); IND.CODEANN.4 31-3-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1979); MONT.CODEANN.§ 40-6-105
(1978). Most states require that the child be legitimated or paternity be established before
an unwed father may be extended a consent privilege. ALA.CODE$26-10-3 (1975); ALASKA
STAT.§ 20.15.040 (1975); ARK.STAT.ANN.$ 56-206 (Supp. 1979); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN.
$ 4 45-61d, 61i (West Supp. 1979); D.C. CODE5 16-304 (1973); FLA.STAT.ANN.§ 63.062
(West Supp. 1979);GA.CODEANN.9 4 74-403, -406 (Supp. 1979); HAW.REV.STAT.§ 578-2
(1976); IDAHO
CODE 16-1504 (1979); IND.CODE.ANN.5 31-3-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1979); KY.
REV.STAT.4 199.500 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV.STAT.ANN. 5 9:404 (1965); MD. ANN.CODE
art. 16, 74 (1957); MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 210, $6 2, 4A (West Supp. 1979); MICH.
COMP.LAWS4 710.33 (Supp. 1979-1980);MINN.STAT.ANN.§ 259.26 (West Supp. 1979);
MONT.CODEANN. 40-6-126 (1978); NEB.REV.STAT.5 43-104.02 (1978); NEV.REV.STAT.
§ 41.530 (1975); N.H. REV.STAT.ANN. 170-B:5 (1977); N.J. STAT.ANN.$ 9:3-38 (West
Supp. 1979-1980);N.M. STAT.ANN.$ 5 46-7-6 to 7 (1978); N.C. GEN.STAT.§ 48-6 (Supp.
1977); N.D. CENT.CODE$ 9 14-15-05to 06 (1971); OR. REV.STAT.§ 109.094 (1977); S.D.
LAWSANN.8 25-6-1.1 (1976); TENN.CODEANN.5 36-111 (1977); UTAHCODEANN.
CODIFIPD
$ 78-30-4 (1977); WASH.REV.CODEANN.8 26.32.040 (Supp. 1978); W. VA.CODE§ 48-4-1
(Supp. 1979).
34. See ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 19, § 532-C (Supp. 1978-1979);MICH.COMP.LAWS§
710.39 (Supp. 1979-1980);MINN.STAT.ANN.§ 259.26 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT.ANN.
$ 9:3-46 (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.C. GEN.STAT.§ 48-6 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV.STAT.4
109.098 (1977); S.C. CODEjj 15-45-70 (1976 & Supp. 1978); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS# 25-6-1
(1976).
35. N.Y. DOM.REL. LAW4 I l l - a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1978-1979).
36. Other states continued to deny the unwed father a consent right. KAN.STAT.
ANN.4 59-2102 (1976); Mrss. CODEANN. 93-17-5 (1972); OHIOREV. CODEANN. 8 3107.06
(Page Supp. 1978);OKLA.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, § § 60.5, .6 (Supp. 1978-1979);PA. STAT.ANN.
tit. 1, § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1964-1978) (statute declared violation of state equal rights
amendment, Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976)).
37. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).

CASENOTE

case dealt specifically with the application of Stanley in the context of an adoption objected to by an unwed father who had never
lived with his illegitimate child, contributed to the child's support, or taken steps to achieve legitimation? Shortly after the
child's birth the mother married Walcott. Nine years later stepfather Walcott petitioned for adoption. Upon notice of the adoption, Quilloin petitioned for legitimation and objected to the
adoption." Applying the "best interests of the child" standard,
the trial court denied Quilloin's legitimation petition, terminated
his parental rights, and granted the adoption. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.40
Relying on S t ~ n l e y , Quilloin
~'
argued to the United States
Supreme Court that his interests had not been adequately protected by the best-interests-of-the-child standard, and that he
was entitled "to an absolute veto over the adoption of his child
absent a finding of his unfitness as a parent."" The Court responded that since Quilloin had never had nor sought custody,
and since the adoption would perpetuate a family unit already in
existence, his substantive due process interests were adequately
protected by the best-interests standard.43The Court also found
Quilloin's interests, for equal protection purposes, distinguishable from those of legal fathers who had divorced or separated from
the mother and who no longer lived with the child. Though Quilloin had been subject to the same child-support obligation as a
legal father would have been, he had never "exercised actual or
legal custody over his child, and thus [had] never shouldered
any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child,"44something a
legal father would have done as a matter of course.
The unanimous Quilloin holding indicated that the Court
viewed Stanley narrowly, and that the unequivocal extension of
equal rights to the unwed father by some legislatures was an
over-rea~tion."~%nunwed father who neither had a custodial
relationship with his child, nor sought one, was found not entitled
to the adoption consent rights reserved to married parents and
46

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 247.
Id. at 250.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
434 U S . at 253.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
Barron, supra note 24, at 541.
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unwed mothers. Conversely, an unwed father who has such a
relationship with his child may be entitled to equal rights to
consent. The extent to which this relational interest constitutes
a basis for consent rights was further explored in Caban v.
Mohammed.

In Caban the Court took up the sex-discrimination argument
left unconsidered by QuilZoin,46 and so investigated the distinctions drawn between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in the
adoption context. The Court rejected the argument that the distinction of section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law
was justified by the fundamental difference between maternal
and paternal relations. Admitting that this generalization might
apply in the case of newborn infants, the Court said that the
relationship of older children with their father may be fully comparable to that with their mother.47
Nor could the distinction be justified by problems of identification and location that would slow the adoption process. Even
if such problems justified a legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of newborn children, they simply would not exist
when the children are older and their father has not only admitted his paternity but has established a "substantial" relationship
with them.4RTherefore, the Court found the statute's distinction
not substantially related to the state's declared objective of promoting adoption of illegitimate children.49

Cuban perpetuates the notion made clear in Quilloin that
parental rights are not based merely on the biological relationship
between parent and child. Instead, parental rights develop
through contacts with the child in a familial situation. Caban also
adds the refinement of distinguishing between fathers of newborns and fathers of older children on the basis of their comparative likelihood of having this familial relationship with their children, and on the basis of the relative problems involved in their
identification and Iocation.
46.
47.
48.
49.

434 U.S. a t 253 n.13.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. a t 389.
Id. a t 392-93.
Id. a t 394.
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Caban Applies Principally to the Adoption of Older Children

Ca ban primarily impacts on the adoption of older children-children "past infancy9'-where the opportunity has existed for the development of a parent-child relationship. But only
those fathers who have admitted paternity," who "come forward
to participate in the rearing of [their children],"" and who have
"remain[ed]" with them," are entitled to consent to the adoption of their children. That the holding of the case is confined to
fathers of that description is underscored by the dissent: "[The
Court] confines its holding to cases such as the one a t hand
involving the adoption of an older child against the wishes of a
natural father who previously has participated in the rearing of
the child and who admits pat ern it^."^^
The distinction between fathers of older children and fathers
of newborns is drawn in the "even if" statements of the opinion,
which respond to the arguments that mothers are closer to their
children than are fathers, and that particular difficulties in the
location and identification of fathers are involved in the adoption
of illegitimates. "Even if," the Court writes, a closer maternal
relationship and problems of location and identification characterize the newborn adoption, they do not necessarily "persist past
infancy."54 Therefore, a legislative distinction between mothers
and fathers of newborns may be justified, but a distinction
applicable in every case, which would fail to recognize a substantial relationship between a n unwed father and his older child,
would not.
But this language alone ambiguously defines the protectable
parent-child relationship. By the facts of the case, a father who
has "come forward to participate in the rearing of his children"
is one who has lived with the mother and the children in a de facto
family for a significant period of time, acknowledged the children
as his own, contributed to their support, and after estrangement
from their mother, continued to visit them. According to Quilloin,
the substance of the relationship is the father's "shoulder[ingl
50. Id. a t 393.
51. Id. a t 392 (emphasis added).
52. Id. a t 392 n.13. This footnote indicates that participation in the rearing of the
children a t some point in time is not enough; tbp father must also maintain, or attempt
to maintain, an ongoing relationship with them a t the time of the adoption proceedings.
Of course the consent of any parent would be "dispensed with" upon proof of abandonment or neglect. See note 6 supra.
53. Id. a t 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
54. Id. a t 392.
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. . . significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child."" Cuban and
Quilloin taken together suggest that actual physical custody is
required. However, the father's relationship with his offspring is
not jeopardized until estrangement from the mother. As the
mother generally retains custody of the child after ~eparation,~"
opportunities for contact with the child, even in the form of financial support, may be limited. Consequently, attention to the social relationship between parent and child alone may be insufficient." For reasons beyond his control, the unwed father may
have enjoyed little or no custodial relations with the child, but
may have contributed, or attempted to contribute, significant
support.
The essence, then, of an unwed father's "com[ing] forward"
is the demonstration of his commitment to the child's welfare
over time-in other words, the demonstration that he has seized
the opportunity, residing with the child or not, to do for the child
what a legal father in similar circumstances presumedly does
from marital obligation." This inquiry is not only important to
the determination of the father's accrued rights to the child, but
also to the evaluation of the likelihood of his future commitment
to the child's welfare.
The question of the father's future commitment is most
immediate when the mother dies, her rights are terminated, or
she surrenders the child for adoption by social and biological
55. 434 U.S. a t 256.
56. In some states an absolute preference for maternal custody exists, even for legitimate children. Most states apply a best-interests-of-the-childstandard, but about half
impose a maternal preference when the parental alternatives appear equal. However,
where illegitimates are concerned, a traditional maternal preference strongly persists. See
generally Foster & Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321 (1978).
57. Some commentators say the sole point of inquiry should be the social relationship
developed between the child and adults in the course of physical custody. These adults
may or may not be the child's natural parents, but in the course of custody they become
the child's "psychological parents," with whom the child develops primary psychological
ties. The main objective of the law, they say, should be to achieve the child's best interests
in the psychological, as well as the physical, sense. The interruption of the continuity of
the child's ties to its psychological parent(s) may be detrimental to its normal developA. FREUD& A. SOLNIT,BEYOND
THE BESTINTERESTS
OF
ment. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN,
THE CHILD(1973).
58. The significance of the marital tie is indicated by the dissent:
The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by
other measures. By tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate
familial relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother.
441 U.S. 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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strangers. If in this circumstance the unwed father is allowed to
veto adoption, he must gain custody of the child as a consequence? Such an unwed father cannot reasonably be found to
have constitutionally protectable rights unless his commitment
to the child's welfare is proven." Cuban indicates that a state
may constitutionally require the demonstration of this commitment in the form of custodial responsibility or financial support.
More troublesome is the situation in the instant case, where
the mother and her new husband seek adoption of the child. Here
the unwed father's custody will probably not be at issue,61and the
vindication of paternal rights may only take the form of visitation
privileged2 Yet vindication of these rights has the effect of foreclosing adoption," therefore perpetuating the child's illegitimate
status and keeping the stepfather a foster parent.64In Cuban the
Court implicitly finds the interests of the child in legitimacy and
the interests of the state in the solidification of the mother's new
marriage outweighed by the unwed father's right to his child.
Certainly only a substantial relationship should compete with
these significant countervailing interest^.^^
59. This is the Stanley situation, where the mother is not claiming any rights t o the
child. The unwed father must be seeking custody in his objection to the adoption. Certainly the Court does not contemplate placing the child in the limbo of foster care or
institutionalization for an indefinite period in order that the unwed father be able to
exercise visitation rights. Cf. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. a t 247 (unwed father did not
seek custody, but only sought to block adoption).
60. The majority's opinion fails to distinguish parental rights from the interests of
the child. The result of extreme emphasis on parental rights is to treat children as a form
of chattel. Emphasis on children's rights may result in nonrecognition of the value of
maintaining blood ties. Actually the two standards are opposite sides of the same coin.
Determination of one should be, to a similar extent, the determination of the other. See
Petition of New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 641, 328 N.E.2d 854,
860 (1975) (the two standards recognized as consisting of "different degrees of emphasis
on the same factors," and as being "not separate and distinct but cognate and connected").
61. See note 56 supra.
62. As a consequence of the Caban decision, the Mohammeds retained custody of the
children subject to the stipulated visitation rights of Caban. Telephone conversation with
Counsel for Appellee, Morris Shulslaper, New York City (Aug. 7, 1979).
63. Axiomatic of adoption is the termination of all parental rights of the natural
parent. As long as some right is given the natural father in this situation, adoption by the
stepfather is impossible. This does not necessarily mean that illegitimacy should or will
be permanent, since statutory provision is generally made that legitimacy results from the
formal or informal establishment of paternity. See note 33 supra.
64. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
65. The Court engaged in this kind of balancing in Quilloin. It must also be noted
that illegitimacy may be more of a burden in some states than in others. At least two states
have abolished the status; others have made the requirement for legitimation simply open
RELATIONS
$ 5.2, a t 158
acknowledgement of paternity. H. CLARK,THELAWOF DOMESTIC
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B. Application of Caban to the Adoption of Newborns

I

Whether Caban applies to adoptions involving newborns is
uncertain. The language of the Court is noncommital to the
argued distinctions between newborn adoptions and adoptions of
older ~hildren.~" footnote of the opinion indicates some judicial
concern for unwed fathers of newborns by suggesting that legislative adjustment give them rights contingent upon more stringent
acknowledgement requirements or more strict definitions of
abandonment? Conditioning the consent of the unwed father of
a newborn on any definition of abandonment, though, contemplates that some fathers of newborns might have a protectable
interest in their offspring arising from support and care of the
mother. However, assessing the father-child relationship according to the father-mother relationship has a certain fictional quality and obstructs realistic assessment of the alternatives available
to the child?
At issue in a paternal challenge to a newborn adoption is not
whether an existing relationship should be interrupted, one where
parental commitment has already been demonstrated, but
whether a parent-child relationship should be allowed to develop.
In the case of a newborn, this issue is decided without reference
to a parental commitment time-tested in actual physical custody
of the child, a circumstance greatly different from the pre-birth
relationship between the father and mother alone.
The best approach to the Court's opinion is to read the "even
(1968). See statutes cited in note 33 supra. That illegitimacy remains a burden is demonstrated by a Supreme Court decision just four months before Caban that approved a
statutory provision foreclosing an illegitimate's inheritance from his natural father because he had not obtained a court order declaring paternity prior to his father's death.
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
66. 441 U.S. a t 389, 392.
67. Id. a t 392 n.11.
68. California dealt with such a sympathetic circumstance years before Stanley in
Lavell v. Adoption Inst., 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960). At the time,
California had a statute that recognized a child as legitimate if the unwed father accepted
the child into his home, acknowledged openly his paternity, and treated the child as
CODE§ 16-1510
legitimate. See also CAL.CIV.CODE§ 7004(a)(4) (West Supp. 1979); IDAHO
(1979). This informal legitimation gave the unwed father all parental rights enjoyed by
traditional parents. Essentially, the statute recognized substantial familial relationships
not formally sanctioned by marriage. In the context of a newborn adoption where the
father had supported the mother, paid birth expenses, indicated a substantial degree of
paternal commitment to a previous child, and shown a great interest in the newborn, the
California court in Lavell held that an unborn child was an existing person for purposes
of the legitimation statute. 185 Cal. App. 2d a t 561, 8 Cal. Rptr. a t 370.
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if" language as approving maintenance of traditional statutory
presumptions in newborn adoptions. Strong dissents support this
position. The dissents argue that unwed mothers and fathers of
newborns are not similarly situated. The mother decides to carry
the child, gives birth, and provides immediate nurture." Consequently, the mother is always an identifiable parent. The father,
on the other hand, is likely to be unknown, unavailable, or uninterested. In these circumstances the child has an important interest in acquiring the "status of legitimacy," and obtaining "the
basic necessities of life."'O Adoption can fulfill these needs, but
adoptive parents are discouraged by delay and the possibility of
confrontation with the natural parents. Requiring the unwed father's consent in all cases would fire adoptive parent fears, delay
the adoption process, and perpetuate the child's i l l e g i t i m a ~ yIf
.~~
the father is never located, notice would not only consume time
and inject added uncertainty into the adoptive relationship, i t
would create added administrative cost and needlessly invade the
privacy of the mother.72
These countervailing policy considerations-achievement of
legitimacy and the encouragement of adoption-peculiarly involved with the adoption of newborns call for focus on the best
interests of the child rather than on parental rights. Though the
two standards essentially measure the same qualities of the
parent-child relationship, they have different effects: the first
enables a more expansive inquiry of the alternatives available to
the child; the second potentially limits the inquiry to the alternatives offered by one or both of the natural parents.73
As in the case of older child adoption, the father's relationship with his newborn offspring becomes pertinent only after the
mother has consented to the child's adoption. If by virtue of his
biological relationship and his seeking custody of the child the
unwed father of the newborn acquired consent rights, simply
proving his biological relationship would foreclose consideration
of any adoption alternative^.^^ A court's inquiry would likewise be
69. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. a t 398-99 (Stewart J., dissenting); id. a t 404-05
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. a t 402 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The state also has an interest-at least for
the purpose of identification of the natural father's heirs-in the child's acquisition of
legitimacy. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
71. 441 U.S. a t 407-08,410 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing In re Malpica-Orsini,
36 N.Y.2d 568, 572-74, 33,l N.E.2d 486, 489-90, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, 516-17 (1975)).
72. 441 U.S. a t 408-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See note 60 supra.
74. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 97 Misc. 2d 927, 416 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Fam. Ct. 1979).

1000

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

limited if the father of the newborn were allowed consent rights
based on some kind of parent-child relationship. This parental
right approach requires initial focus upon the relationship between father and child. Only upon finding the lack of a protectable relationship can the court's inquiry pass from parental rights
to the best interests of the child in an adoption context.
If an unwed father of a newborn seeks to block the adoption
of his offspring, a court should not be confined to a paternal rights
inquiry. Because such a father has not established a substantial
relationship with the child, a court's procedure should focus on
the child's best interests. Married parents, unwed mothers, and
now some unwed fathers of older children are given consent rights
in order to protect a real or presumed relationship with the child.
Their consent right is based upon the presumption that a parent
has first claim to the child without consideration of other alternatives, not just because of biological ties, but because of a commitment to the child's welfare, evidenced by a marital obligation, the
biological nurture of pregnancy and infancy, or a time-based famBecause he has neither married the mother nor
ilial relati~nship.'~
had the opportunity to engage in a de facto familial relationship
with the child, an unwed father of a newborn can present no
substantial evidence of a real or presumptive commitment to the
child's welfare. At best, a consent right could only be based upon
speculative criteria related to the father's pre-birth relationship
with the mother, or upon his post-birth indications of desire and
In this case, decided since Caban, a college-aged couple produced a child after dating and
the development of a "serious relationship." A month after the child's birth, the mother
placed the child for adoption. The father, acknowledging paternity, appeared a t the adoption proceedings to oppose the adoption and to gain custody of the child. Upon this action
by the father, the mother withdrew her surrender for adoption and cross-petitioned for
custody. The family court held that the unwed father had the right to veto the adoption
and to gain custody. Considering the respective situations of the natural parents, as well
as the mother's initial attempt to have the child adopted, the court judged the best
interests of the child to be furthered by the natural father having custody, even though
he would be living at home with his parents while attending college. Fkferring to Caban,
the court wrote: "This court does not treat lightly the mother's decision to give Rachel
up for adoption, but such a decision is not within her option without the concurrence of
the father. (See Caban v. Mohammed, supra.) A child is born to two parents and both
have natural rights to said child." Id. at 932,416 N.Y.S.2d at 733. Reliance on Caban had
the effect of isolating the custody inquiry to the respective qualifications of the two natural
parents, though the best alternative may have been adoption.
75. These presumptions have been the underlying reason for the governmental restraint implied in the statutory criteria for termination or "dispensation" of parental
rights. See note 6 supra. The state presumes parental fitness, and so will not interfere with
familial relations by usurping parental rights until one or more of the dispensing criteria
is proven. See H. CLARK,
supra note 65, 8 18.5.

9871

CASENOTE

1001

ability to adequately care for the infant.
Applying a best-interests-of-the-child standard, a court
could award custody to an unwed father of a newborn. But a court
should make such a decision only after thoroughly considering the
newborn's alternatives, including the potential for its welfare
with adoptive parents.

C. Statutory Revision Compatible with Caban
Because the Supreme Court recognizes the practical differences between unwed mothers and unwed fathers of newborns, as
well as the countervailing concerns of legitimacy and adoption
that attend the mother's decision to surrender her child, a state
would be justified in imposing in the area of newborn adoption
the statutory distinctions traditionally applied to unwed parents
in general. Caban, in company with Quilloin, indicates that
states that extend a general consent right to unwed fathers go
further than constitutionally necessary. Even those states that
allow consent upon acknowledgement of paternity without reference to a familial relationship exceed constitutional demands. As
the dissent notes, state legislatures may discriminate between
unwed fathers and unwed mothers if they make adequate provision for Caban- type fathers.76
1. Providing constitutional protection for Caban-type fathers

There should be little problem in the identification and location of the unwed father who has a substantial relationship with
his older children." Indeed, if there is an ongoing relationship of
the sort contemplated by Caban and Quilloin, the unwed father
76. Cautioning that the majority opinion should be read narrowly, Justice Stevens
wrote:
The procedure to be followed in cases involving infants who are in the custody
of their mothers-whether solely or jointly with the father-or of agencies with
authority to consent to adoption, is entirely unaffected by the Court's holding
or by its reasoning. In fact, as I read the Court's opinion, the statutes now in
effect may be enforced as usual unless "the adoption of older children is sought,"
ante, a t 392, and "the father has established a substantial relationship with the
child and [is willing to admit] his paternity." Ante, a t 393. State legislatures
will no doubt promptly revise their adoption laws to comply with the rule of this
case, but as long as state courts are prepared to construe their existing statutes
to contain a requirement of paternal consent "in cases such as this," ibid., I see
no reason why they may not continue to enter valid adoption decrees in the
countless routine cases that will arise before the statutes can be amended.
441 US. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and brackets in original).
77. Id. a t 393.
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may be expected to pursue the protection of his interests on his
With older children there is greater likelihood of fatherchild interaction. But this likelihood alone does not justify due
process protection. In cases where the father of an older child is
identified and located, the state must require notice and a hearing, as the very fact he is known and locatable adds to the likelihood of a substantive relationship. Conversely, the fact that the
unwed father of an older child is unidentifiable or unlocatable
militates against the existence of such a r e l a t i ~ n s h i p In
. ~ ~this
latter situation, a state should require only reasonable efforts to
notify the father concerning the prospective adoption. In most
cases "reasonable effort" will only require notice by p u b l i c a t i ~ n . ~ ~
However, notice by publication should be resorted to only if the
circumstances surrounding the mother's consent indicate she is
withholding information necessary to notify the father. This reticence towards notice by publication is justified because publication could result in an unwarranted invasion of the mother's privac~.~l
2.

Constitutional protection for unwed fathers of newborns

Even if the unwed father of a newborn is not allowed a consent privilege, he may have a protectable interest in the custody
of his offspring. If read broadly, Stanley requires that notice and
a hearing be given the unwed father before even potential custodial rights are cut off. Read narrowly, Stanley requires proce78. One state statute places primary responsibility on the unwed father to protect his
rights. OR. REV. STAT.§ 109.096(~)(5)(1977).
79. See, e.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 13, $ § 906, 908 (Supp. 1978) (court may dispense
with consent of father if mother unable to identify, and has not lived with or married him
since child's birth); MICH.COMP.LAWS$ 710.37 (Supp. 1979-1980) (termination of paternal rights if identity or location not known and has not made provision for mother). Cf.
GA.CODEANN. § 74-406 (Supp. 1979) (if identity and location not known, notice required
only if there exists a "familial bond").
80. Illinois requires notice to all fathers, known or unknown. Publication is made in
all cases where the father is not known. So regardless of whether the mother discloses the
father's identity, notice is given. To protect the mother's privacy interests, her name is
not included, making the publication of questionable value. ILL. REV.STAT.ch. 40, 5 1509
(1977) (ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 4, $ 9.1-7 (1973)). In other states the mother is required to
disclose the identity of the father and the degree of his relationship. See GA.CODEANN. §
74-404 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT.8 109.092 (1977); R.I. GEN.LAWS§ 15-7-26 (Supp.
1978). Some states simply do not require notice to the unknown father. See MICH.COMP.
LAWS$ 710.37 (Supp. 1979-1980); MINN. STAT.ANN. § § 259.24, .26 (West Supp. 1979).
81. Admittedly, if a mother has lived openly with her illegitimate child, she may not
have much of a privacy interest. But it is conceivable that a mother of older children could
have a privacy interest if, for example, she has represented the child as legitimate.
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dural due process only when the unwed father has actually "sired
and raised" his children." Following the latter argument, an
unwed father of a newborn would by definition have no constitutionally protectable interest in his child.
An approach that would better allow for the competing interests involved would be to allow the unwed father of the newborn
notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning the child's best
interests if he has demonstrated his interests in the child by some
form of acknowledgement within a reasonable time after learning
of pregnancy or after the child's birth? It is difficult to define the
basis for such a right since "[plarental rights do not spring fullblown from the biological connection between parent and child.
They require relationships more enduring."84If not derived from
the biological relationship alone, perhaps the right to notice and
a hearing upon some formal showing of interest derives from the
policy suggested by Stanley-that a state's interests in pursuing
a child's welfare are de minimis when a natural parent is able to
provide adequate care? Therefore, notice should be given to provide an opportunity to demonstrate paternal ability and desire to
provide for the welfare of a newborn. Because the paternal interest in the custody of a newborn has not specifically achieved
constitutional ~ t a t u r e , ~ h ngiven
d
the countervailing concerns,
notice in these cases should be given with economy-particularly
with economy of time.
Not only is rapid disposition a greater concern in the case of
newborns, but the mother undoubtedly has more substantial privacy interests. Rapid disposition is important to protect the
child's interest in legitimacy and adequate nurture in a family
environment, for the likelihood of adoption decreases as a child
grows older." And the fact that the mother seeks immediate post82. 405 U.S. at 651.
83. See, e.g., MICH.COMP.LAWS4 710.33 (Supp. 1979-1980) (before birth of illegitimate, father must file under oath notice of intent to claim paternity); MONT.CODEANN.
9 40-6-126 (1978); UTAHCODEANN. 4 78-30-4 (1977) (notice of claim of paternity and
willingness and intent to support filed with bureau of vital statistics).
84. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. a t 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
85. 405 U.S. a t 657-58.
86. In Quilloin, where the unwed father was not found to have parental rights, the
Supreme Court noted that Quilloin could not complain that he did not receive due process. 434 U.S. at 253. Under the Georgia procedure, Quilloin had received notice and a
legitimation hearing where he was allowed to present evidence concerning any matter he
thought relevant, including his fitness as a parent. Therefore, the Court did not reach the
question whether procedural due process is required in a Quilloin situation. Id.
87. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. a t 404 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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birth adoption to some extent indicates her desire for privacy. An
older mother will have lived openly with her child, and so will not
have privacy interests as fragile as those of the mother of the
newborn.88Only if it appears that the mother intentionally conceals the identity of the father should the court consider notice
by publication. But in doing so it must weigh the interests of the
mother and the child against the potential interest of the father.
If the unwed father of the newborn is unidentified and unlocated
at the time of the adoption proceeding, he should be presumed
uninterested, and any rights he might claim to the child should
be terminated.89And to guard the interest of the adoptive parents
in unconditional custody of the child, the same presumption
should attach to the unwed father's failure, after notice, to appear
As noted by the Stanley Court, granting a hearing to those
few unwed fathers who come forward voluntarily or in response
to notice should not cause great burden or delay?' Once the father
of a newborn is in court, the evidence he presents concerning the
alternatives he and the adoptive parents offer should be weighed
according to the child's best interests. This weighing should not
include only the comparative material advantages of the parties,
but should consider the possible value of maintaining blood kinship and the comparative opportunities of the child for legitimation." Only if the unwed father can clearly demonstrate an ability
and desire to care for the child should his custody be allowed, and
adoption foreclosed.

IV. CONCLUSION
In Caban v. Mohammed the Supreme Court held a statute
allowing unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, the right to ob88. See Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption
to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 524-25 (1973).
89. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
90. See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. 4 74-406(c)-(d) (Supp. 1979); ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit.
19, 4 532-C (Supp. 1978-1979);MASS.GEN.LAWSANN. ch. 210, 4 4A (West Supp. 1979);
MICH.COMP.LAWS4 710.36 (Supp. 1979-1980).
91. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
92. After all, it is possible that the child's likelihood for obtaining a stable environment could best be served by maintaining the blood relationship with its natural parent.
Perhaps allowing a fit natural parent to maintain custody of the child would actually
encourage marriage. A child who remained with his or her blood kin would certainly not
face the stigma that attaches to adoption. And some commentators have noted that the
adoptive relationship is fraught with uncertainty, instability, and search for identity. See
A. BARAN
& R. PANNOR,
THEADOPTION
TRIANGLE
(1978).
generally A. SOROSKY,

9871

CASENOTE

1005

ject to the adoption of their illegitimate children violative of the
equal protection clause as an over-inclusive gender-based classification. The Court did not, however, extend equal adoption consent rights to all unwed fathers. Instead, it restricted the application of its holding to adoptions involving older children where the
unwed father has established a "substantial" familial relationship with his offspring. The remainder of unwed fathers-fathers
of newborn infants-are not entitled to automatic rights. Yet they
may be entitled to a hearing to determine their ability, as compared to adoptive parents, to provide for the best interests of the
child. A state legislature, therefore, may constitutionally discriminate between unwed mothers and unwed fathers as long as adequate provision is made for the father of older children who enjoys
a substantial parent-child relationship.

Stephen Jerry Sturgill

